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Abstract
While there is a great deal of literature focusing on the relationship between income and
fertility, little is known about how wealth aﬀects fertility decisions of the household.
This paper ﬁlls this gap in the literature by investigating how changes in housing
wealth aﬀect fertility. In particular, we use the wealth variation supplied by the recent
housing boom and bust to generate exogenous variation in household wealth. We ﬁrst
conduct a state-level aggregate analysis to investigate how the birth rate is related to
housing prices using diﬀerences in the timing and size of the housing market boom and
bust across diﬀerent states over time. We then conduct an analysis using restricted-use
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics that allows us to track how women’s
fertility behavior is related to individual-level housing price growth. The demographic
and geographic controls in the PSID allow us to control extensively for any confounding
eﬀects driven by household selection across diﬀerent cities or neighborhoods, and we
ﬁnd that for homeowners, a $10,000 increase in real housing wealth causes a 0.07
percent increase in fertility. We ﬁnd little eﬀects of MSA-level housing price growth
on the fertility of renters, which supports our identiﬁcation strategy. That increases
in housing wealth are strongly associated with increases in fertility is consistent with
some recent work showing a positive income eﬀect on births, and our estimates are
suggestive that the large recent variation in the housing market could have sizeable
demographic eﬀects that are driven by the positive eﬀect of housing wealth on fertility.
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A long literature in economics dating back to Malthus (1798) has focused on the fertility
decisions of households and how these decisions are inﬂuenced by ﬁnancial incentives. Becker
(1960) introduced children into economic models as a durable good in the utility function of
the parents. Because there are few substitutes for children, they generally are assumed to be
normal goods, implying that fertility should respond positively to an increase in household
income or wealth.
The empirical evidence to date is largely inconsistent with this assumption. Across
countries, there is a strong negative correlation between GDP and fertility. Within countries,
there is cross-sectional evidence of a negative correlation between income and fertility across
households (see Jones, Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2008)). For example, in the United States,
Jones and Tertilt (2008) estimate an income elasticity for fertility of about -0.38 using data
from the U.S. Census over the last century and a half. Time series data yield similar ﬁndings;
household income has increased while fertility has decreased. A large number of papers
also link the higher incomes that came with the industrial revolution to the demographic
transition of industrial countries (recent examples include Clark (2005), Galor (2005), and
Bar and Leukhina (forthcoming)).
Becker (1960) assumed that children were normal goods, but then had to reconcile this
assumption with the observed negative correlation between income and fertility. He added
child quality to his model, which created a quantity-quality trade-oﬀ, to generate the negative
relationship between income and fertility.1 Other authors point to the importance of female
time-use in the decision to have a child. Butz and Ward (1979), Schultz (1985), and Heckman
and Walker (1990) all ﬁnd evidence that fertility is decreasing in female wage rates and argue
that the negative correlation between income and fertility is a substitution eﬀect due to higher
wages. However, even controlling for female wages, the negative correlation between income
1Jones, Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2008) show that adding a quality choice by itself does not generate a
negative income-fertility relationship without also assuming a high elasticity of substitution between children
and consumption.
2and fertility generally remains.
Most of the evidence documenting the negative income elasticity of fertility employs
cross-sectional data across households or locations within the United States. Such data are
problematic for identifying the income elasticity of fertility because wages and the cost of
living vary systematically with income and both should negatively aﬀect fertility. Higher
wages implies a higher value on the time cost of raising a child. Higher cost of living implies
a higher cost of goods that are complementary to raising a child. If income growth over time
has been met with even larger increases in the cost of living, particularly in urban areas,
income elasticity of fertility estimates that fail to account for the rising cost of living will be
negatively biased. Furthermore, if women with lower preferences for children sort into areas
with a higher cost of living (and thus a higher cost of raising a child), this selection could
drive the negative relationship between income and fertility found in cross-sectional data.
Several recent studies have sought to overcome these problem by using arguably exoge-
nous income shocks to identify income eﬀects on fertility. These analyses tend to show that
households fertility responds positively to such shocks. Lindo (forthcoming) and Amilachuk
(2006) both show that fertility is negatively aﬀected by shocks to family income brought
about by job loss. However, these authors face diﬃculties in disentangling the eﬀect of job
loss per se on fertility from the eﬀect on family income. Black et al. (2009) ﬁnd that the 1970s
West Virginia coal boom created a large positive shock to male income and subsequently
increased fertility. While this evidence is suggestive that fertility and family resources are
positively linked, it is restricted to a speciﬁc region and time period that make the ﬁndings
hard to generalize to the rest of the United States.2
2There also is evidence that fertility responds positively to exogenous changes to the ﬁnancial incentives
of having a child. Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2003) ﬁnd some evidence of a positive fertility response
to Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) expansions in the 1990s, primarily for married non-white women.
Goda and Mumford (2009) show that the long-run eﬀect of child tax beneﬁts in the U.S. on fertility is
small but positive, primarily operating through the timing of births. Internationally, Milligan (2005) ﬁnds a
large fertility response to a temporary child subsidy program in Quebec, however Parent and Wang (2007)
show that women in Quebec may have had children earlier in order to claim the subsidy with no change in
their completed fertility. Cohen, Dehejia and Romanov (2007) estimate a strong positive eﬀect of ﬁnancial
incentives on fertility among low-income populations in Israel.
3Despite this recent evidence from income shocks that children may indeed be normal
goods, no study to date has identiﬁed how household fertility responds to the wealth of the
household rather than simply the income of the household. Excluding household wealth
may be particularly problematic because it can cause one to mis-characterize the ﬁnancial
resources of the household. If household fertility is a function of total resources, using
income as a proxy for these resources may yield an incomplete picture of how resources
aﬀect fertility. By focusing on household wealth, we also are able to examine the relationship
between household resources and fertility using variation that is more plausibly unrelated to
the relative tradeoﬀ between home and market production than the wage and employment
shocks that have been studied previously.
The lack of information on the fertility response to household wealth variation likely is due
to the fact that households make joint labor supply, savings, and fertility decisions that make
identifying causal eﬀects very diﬃcult. In this paper, we seek to overcome this identiﬁcation
problem by using the wealth variation supplied by the recent housing boom and bust. We
analyze housing wealth for several reasons. First, about 50% of women of child-bearing age
in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which are the data we use in this analysis, own
a home. Second, for these women, and for the United States as a whole, housing wealth
represents the vast majority of total household wealth. Indeed, for most households, it is the
only form of household wealth. Finally, we are able to use the most recent housing boom and
subsequent bust to generate exogenous variation in household wealth in order to identify the
causal eﬀect of wealth shocks on fertility decisions. The housing boom, which began in the
late 1990s, was characterized by large increases in home prices that occurred diﬀerentially
across cities and by an increased liquidity of home equity. Homeowners who lived in high
growth areas experienced a large increase in their liquid wealth relative to homeowners in
other lower-growth areas and relative to renters throughout the United States.
The housing boom and the associated bust provide a unique opportunity to study how
wealth ﬂuctuations aﬀect fertility choices. Our empirical strategy is to examine how the
4likelihood a woman gives birth is inﬂuenced by short-run variation in the value of her home.
Lovenheim (2009) uses a similar method for identifying the causal eﬀect of housing wealth
on college attendance, and it is based on the fact that the geographic variation in the
strength and timing of the housing boom was conditionally exogenous to individual household
behavior. Because of the large recent busts in the housing market, we are able to include
both positive and negative wealth shocks in our analysis; previous studies of the relationship
between income and fertility have been restricted to examining only positive or negative
shocks, not both.
We employ two types of data to analyze the eﬀect of housing wealth on fertility. First,
we examine aggregate state-level vital statistics data on births combined with state home
price indices from 1976-2008 and shown that once one controls for state ﬁxed eﬀects, there
is evidence of a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between income and fertility. These
results are consistent with a positive wealth shock causing an increase in fertility and are
large despite the fact that only about half of women of child-bearing age own homes. Only
homeowners experience the positive wealth shock, while both homeowners and renters ex-
perience the substitution eﬀect from the increase in housing costs. It is not clear from such
aggregate data whether the results are being driven solely by homeowners or whether renters
play some role. In addition, the identiﬁcation is susceptible to the claim of an unobserved
correlated shock at the state level that is driving both fertility decisions and home prices
(such as unobserved economic shocks).
To more credibly identify the eﬀect of wealth on fertility, we turn to micro panel data to
examine how individual women’s fertility respond to short-run variation in their home value.
We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics from 1990-2007 that allow us to
identify homeownership status as well as the city of residence. We use wealth variation over
time within cities to examine whether families in higher-growth areas made diﬀerent fertility
decisions than families in lower-growth areas. Similar to the state-level eﬀects, we ﬁnd that
a short-run increase in one’s home value is associated with a positive and signiﬁcant increase
5in the likelihood of having a child. The marginal eﬀects are small: a $10,000 increase in the
value of a home is associated with a 0.07 percent increase in the likelihood of having a child.
However, given the large recent variation in housing prices, even such small marginal eﬀects
are economically meaningful. Among renters, housing price increases have little eﬀect and
even may reduce the likelihood of giving birth, which suggests our estimates are not being
driven by unobserved economic shocks at the state or local level.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the state-level
evidence that the fertility rate is positively inﬂuenced by an increase in housing prices.
Section 3 presents the individual-level evidence that fertility is positively inﬂuence by an
increase in housing wealth for homeowners. Section 4 concludes.
2 State-Level Evidence
2.1 Data
We construct a quarterly state birthrate measure using data on the number of births per
thousand women age 15 to 44 from the CDC National Vital Statistics Reports from 1976
to 2008.3 We use the unemployment rate and income per capita for each state as our
indicators of overall economic conditions, which are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Our state-level housing price measure is the Federal Housing Finance Agency
Housing Price Index (HPI).4 This index is constructed from all repeat-sale single-family
homes whose mortgages have been securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac in each year.
This index previously was known as the Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO) index and is widely used in the housing literature. In order to make the index
comparable across several years, we scale it by the CPI-U to put it into constant 2008 dollars.
The summary statistics are given in Table 1 for both the 1976-2008 and 2000-2008 time
3These data are available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss.htm.
4These data are available at http://www.fhfa.gov.
6periods. The means in Table 1 show that births per 1,000 women has remained largely
stable over time at 16.7-16.8. However, consistent with the 2000s housing boom, the level
and variation in housing prices both grew over time. For example, between 1976 and 2008,
average real home prices grew by 3.9% over each two-year period. Between 2000-2008, real
home price increases over two years averaged 9.9%.
The correlation between housing price changes and birth rates over time is shown in
Figure 1. This ﬁgure plots the births per 1,000 women age 15-44 in the country as the solid
line and the dashed line is the percentage change in real housing price. Although on diﬀerent
scales, these data are consistent with there being a negative relationship between housing
price variation and fertility. In times of high housing price growth, fertility appears to fall
and vice versa. Thus, at least in the aggregate, this ﬁgure is suggestive that housing prices
negatively aﬀect fertility. However, this ﬁgure also shows evidence of a delayed positive
fertility response to an increase in real housing price, which is what we examine below
empirically.
Figure 2 demonstrates the diﬃculty with using aggregate cross-sectional measures in
attempting to identify the causal eﬀect of income or wealth on fertility. In Panel A, we
show further aggregate evidence of a strong negative cross-sectional relationship between
home prices and fertility. The panel shows the average birth rate by state between 1976
and 2008 plotted against the average home price index. States with high home prices have
lower fertility in the raw data. In Panel B, we show a similar graph, but for births per 1,000
women aged 15-44 and log real per capita income at the state level. A negative correlation
similar to the one in panel A is present. Panel C presents a graph of log real income per
capita versus our housing price index and demonstrates the diﬃculty in interpreting the
evidence in panels A and B as causal. This panel shows a strong positive relationship
between housing prices and income, which means that the places with the highest incomes
(and thus the lowest fertility), also have the highest cost of living. Without accounting for
the fact that high-income households may have low cost-of-living-adjusted real incomes and
7that households with diﬀerent underlying fertility rates can select into areas with diﬀerent
housing prices, cross-sectional estimates of the relationship of income and housing prices
on fertility potentially contain large negative biases. The remainder of this paper seeks to
generate more rigorous empirical estimates of the causal role of housing wealth on household
fertility decisions that are more robust to such criticisms.
2.2 Estimation Strategy and Results
In order to obtain baseline estimates of the relationship between housing prices and fertility,
we estimate variations of the following model at the quarterly level from 1976 to 2008
ln(birthrate)sqt = β0 + β1HPIsqt + β2unemploymentsqt + β3incomesqt + δq + θs + φt + ǫsqt, (1)
where s indexes state, q indexes quarter and t indexes year. The variable HPI is the home
price index discussed in the previous section, and ln(birthrate) is the log of the birthrate
per 1,000 women aged 15-44. The model includes controls for the unemployment rate, real
income per capita, as well as state, quarter and year ﬁxed eﬀects. The coeﬃcient of interest
in this model is β1, which shows how variation in home prices is related to birth rates. In
order for β1 to identify the causal eﬀect of home prices on birth rates, home price changes,
conditional on the observables in the model, must be uncorrelated with unobserved, secular
trends in birth rates. While we believe this is a reasonable assumption given our control
variables, particularly because we control for state-level macroeconomic conditions using
unemployment rates and per-capita income, below we present models that are identiﬁed
under less stringent assumptions.
Table 2 reports our estimates from equation (1) using quarterly state-level observations,
with Washington D.C. included along with each U.S. state. The regression is estimated using
weights that are proportional to the female population, and standard errors are clustered at
the state level.
8As reported in Column (1) of Table 2, Panel A and consistent with Figure 2, fertility is
negatively associated with real housing price controlling for the state unemployment rate,
state real income per-capita, and quarter ﬁxed eﬀects. As shown in Column (2), adding year
ﬁxed eﬀects does not change this result, although neither estimate is statistically signiﬁcant
at even the 10% level. However, when we include state ﬁxed eﬀects in Column (3), we ﬁnd
positive and signiﬁcant evidence that higher housing prices lead to higher fertility rates.
Because state ﬁxed eﬀects control for the underlying composition of individuals living in the
state and control for average cost of living in each state, β1 in this speciﬁcation is being
identiﬁed oﬀ of changes within states over time in housing prices. Once one eliminates the
cross-sectional variation in housing prices in the sample, a 1 unit increase in the housing price
index is associated with a 0.23 percent increase in the birth rate. As Column (4) shows, the
estimate is still positive, though not signiﬁcant, when controlling for year ﬁxed eﬀects as
well.
Although we see evidence in Table 2, Panel A that once one includes state ﬁxed eﬀects the
eﬀect of housing price levels on fertility is positive, examining the change in housing prices
within states likely is a better method for identifying the causal eﬀect of housing wealth
on fertility because housing prices and housing wealth are potentially very diﬀerent. This
diﬀerence arises because one can own an expensive home and have no equity (and vice versa).
However, changes in housing prices translate fully into wealth changes for homeowners. In
Table 2, Panel B, we show results from estimation of a variant of equation (1) in which we
use the lagged two-year percentage change in the housing price index rather than the index
level. As suggested by Figure 1, fertility may respond to a change in housing price with a





where t is time measured in quarters. Again, each observation is weighted by the size of the
9female population of the state in that quarter. While the choice of both the two-year lag
used to calculate %∆HPIt is arbitrary, the use of a lag is necessary both to identify housing
wealth eﬀects and because the birth of a child will lag the decision to have a child by at least
nine months and frequently longer.5
Because we are analyzing changes in housing prices rather than the housing price level,
we can be less concerned about the negative correlation between states with high housing
prices and fertility because here, we are just measuring the percentage change in the home
price index. As Lovenheim (2009) shows, home price increases, particularly during the
housing boom, were not limited simply to high housing-price states or cities. Rather, many
historically lower-price cities and many lower-income individuals in those cities experienced
large wealth increases from the housing boom (and therefore a large wealth decline from the
bust).
Column (1) of Table 2, Panel B indicates a large fertility response to state-level housing
price changes, even absent state ﬁxed eﬀects. When we include state ﬁxed eﬀects in Column
(3), the estimate is similar in magnitude to that from Column (1) and is now statistically
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level. However, when we control for year ﬁxed
eﬀects as in Columns (2) and (4), the estimated eﬀect shrinks in magnitude. This result
stems from the fact that high housing growth years tend also to be high fertility years in all
states (as suggested by Figure 1), not just in the states with high housing growth. Positive
economic conditions that are correlated with housing price growth likely are responsible for
this eﬀect and are removed through the year ﬁxed eﬀects. Controlling for both year and
state ﬁxed eﬀects in Column (4) yields an estimate of 0.0360, which is statistically diﬀerent
from zero at the 10 percent level. This estimate suggests a 10 percent increase in housing
prices corresponds to a 0.36 percent increase in the fertility rate. A 10 percent increase in
real housing price is an approximate $16,000 increase for the mean housing price, which is
5Estimating a distributed lag model, where we do not need to choose a speciﬁc lag but allow the model
to estimate the relevant impact of the lags, results in a long run propensity that is positive, similar in
magnitude, and statistically signiﬁcant.
10suggestive of a sizable response of fertility to housing wealth changes. Furthermore, there
is evidence this eﬀect is increasing: estimation of equation (1) for years 2000 through 2008
and including state and year ﬁxed eﬀects yield an estimate on the lagged percentage housing
price change of 0.0685, which is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level. Thus, as
housing prices became more volatile during the housing boom and bust, fertility became
more responsive to this variation.
One of the drawbacks from using aggregate state-level evidence is that one cannot dis-
tinguish between homeowners and renters. Home price changes should have opposite eﬀects
on homeowners and renters: a given positive home price shock increases the price of housing
for both homeowners and renters, but makes only homeowners wealthier. Thus, the state-
level regressions may be understating the income eﬀect of housing price changes on fertility
because they average together the home owner and the renter responses, which likely have
opposite signs. Furthermore, as previously discussed, the aggregate responses could be driven
at least in part by changing selection over time across states or by unobserved state-speciﬁc
economic shocks that are driving both the fertility behavior and the housing price changes.
We next turn to micro data in order to generate estimates of the fertility eﬀect of housing
wealth changes that are more robust to these confounding inﬂuences.
3 Individual-Level Evidence
3.1 Data
We use restricted-use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a longitudinal
data set that began with a representative set of households in 1968. Since that time, it has
followed these respondents and their descendants continually. The main advantages of the
PSID over other available survey data is that the PSID is a long panel that allows us to
track changes in the family’s home price prior to a child’s birth. The data also contain a rich
set of individual and family background information that are instrumental in controlling for
11selection of families with diﬀerent fertility patterns into cities with diﬀerent housing growth
rates. We use the restricted-use geocode ﬁles that allow us to identify the metropolitan
statistical area (MSA), or city, in which each woman lives. These geographic identiﬁers
allow us to control in a very detailed manner for such selection.
The PSID sample is comprised of women age 15-44 who are descendants of original PSID
members and who therefore are followed continuously regardless of marital status.6 Using
the PSID natality ﬁles, which contain a detailed record of all births to sample participants,
we construct the variable birth, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a woman gives birth
within a year prior to the survey date. We use the reported market value of the home as our
home price measure. This value is reported by the respondent in each survey and thus is
consistently measured over time. Lovenheim (2009) shows that these self-reported housing
values match up closely with national trends in housing prices, suggesting self-reports contain
little systematic bias. Homeownership status is calculated throughout as of the survey year.7
For renters, the market housing price is the mean housing price in their MSA and survey year
from all homeowners in the sample. We also control for women’s age categories, women’s
education attainment levels, real family income, marital status and the number of other
children in the home.8
Table 3 contains summary statistics of the PSID data we use, separately for homeown-
ers and renters. Predictably, the table shows that renters have higher fertility rates than
homeowners, at 6.9% versus 4.9%. Renters also tend to live in areas with higher housing
prices, are less likely to be married, are younger and are less educated. The mean home value
6Many women appear in the sample because they marry or co-habitate with an original PSID member
descendant. If the relationship ends, the woman no longer is in the sample. Thus, we focus on the sample of
women whom we can follow continuously over time to avoid sample selection biases driven by divorce and
breakups.
7A possible objection to measuring homeownership in the survey year is that it is endogenous. When we
deﬁne homeownership with a two or four-year lag, our results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar.
These results are available from the authors upon request.
8We cannot determine in our data whether a child living in a home with a woman is that woman’s child.
We use the number of other children who were not just born as a proxy for the number of children to which
a woman has given birth. Given the data, this method is a reasonable one for controlling for the fact that
the fertility hazard declines with number of existing children.
12among homeowners is about $166,000, but the variance of this variable is large. Similarly,
the average home price increase over two years is about $35,000 and over four years is over
$60,000, and both measures exhibit a large amount of variation in the data with standard
deviations signiﬁcantly larger than the means. Furthermore, housing price changes are both
positive and negative; over two years, over 21% of the changes are negative and over four
years 17% are negative. Examining housing price eﬀects on fertility over this time period
thus allows us to use both wealth increases and decreases to identify the eﬀects of interest,
whereas past work in this area has only been able to examine positive or negative income
shocks.
3.2 Estimation Strategy and Results
We estimate linear probability models of the following form for homeowners on the PSID
data described in the previous section from 1990-2007:9
birthist = β0 + β1House V alueist + γXist + θs + φt + ηist, (3)
where i indexes women, s indexes state or MSA (depending on the speciﬁcation) and t
indexes survey year. The vector X is the set of observable characteristics shown in Table 3
as well as the state-by-year average unemployment rate and log real income per capita. The
θs are state or MSA ﬁxed eﬀects and φt are year ﬁxed eﬀects. The coeﬃcient of interest in
equation (3) is β1, which shows how the likelihood of having a child in the previous year is
associated with home prices.10 We measure home prices in 3 ways: real home price level,
9Given low likelihood of birth in each year, it is not clear a linear model is appropriate. However, marginal
eﬀects from a logit model yield very similar results. These estimates are available from the authors upon
request, but we report linear probability model coeﬃcients due to their ease of interpretation.
10Note that equation (3) will not allow us to disentangle the eﬀects of housing wealth on fertility timing
from the eﬀect on total fertility. Using an event study framework surrounding men’s job losses, Lindo (2009)
shows the job loss ﬁrst accelerates and then decelerates fertility, with a long-run negative eﬀect. Much of
this timing eﬀect likely can be attributed to the fact that fertility increases when the father’s opportunity
cost of time decreases in the short-run. Because housing wealth changes do not alter the opportunity cost of
time, timing eﬀects are unlikely to be substantively large in this analysis. However, even if the whole eﬀect
we estimate is a change in the timing of fertility, in the long-run such changes manifest themselves similarly
13two-year change in real home prices and four-year change in real home prices.
The identiﬁcation assumption underlying equation (3) is that housing price changes are
conditionally exogenous to the fertility decision. In other words, but for the fact that housing
prices increase household wealth, home prices changes and fertility should be uncorrelated
conditional on the observables in the model. There are two main threats to this assump-
tion. The ﬁrst is a positive correlation between housing prices and local macroeconomic
conditions. If fertility responds positively to macroeconomic conditions,11 our housing price
change measures simply may be picking up this relationship rather than identifying the ef-
fect of housing wealth changes on fertility decisions. To guard against this possibility, we
control for the state-average unemployment rate and real income per capita, which are direct
measures of state-level macroeconomic conditions. We also estimate a model using state-by-
year ﬁxed eﬀects, which will control for all unobservable factors common within state and
year. With such ﬁxed eﬀects, β1 is identiﬁed oﬀ of housing price growth diﬀerences among
homeowners within a state and year. While it still is possible for these within state and year
diﬀerences to be driven by economic shocks, the local dynamics of housing price changes is
more likely driven by exogenous factors such as local supply constraints than is the variation
within states over time (Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai (2006) and Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks
(2005)). Most notably, this method controls for uniform state-year-level economic shocks.
The estimates using state-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects (reported in Table A-1 of the Appendix) are
very similar to the baseline models discussed below, which is suggestive that macroeconomic
shocks are not confounding our estimates.
The second potential threat to identiﬁcation is selection of households across states, across
MSAs within states, or across neighborhoods within MSAs. If women who are planning to
have children purchase homes in places that are most likely to experience high housing price
growth in the near future, our estimates will be biased upward. In order to address this
in the macroeconomy to a total fertility change.
11Note that there is no evidence in the literature that such a relationship exists. In fact, aggregate trends
of macroeconomic conditions and fertility would suggest that they are negatively correlated.
14problem, we use successively more restrictive housing price growth variation to estimate
equation (3). First, we employ state ﬁxed eﬀects, which allow for housing price growth
across time within states as well as cross-sectionally across MSAS and neighborhoods within
an MSA. We then include MSA ﬁxed eﬀects using the restricted-access geocodes from the
PSID. This speciﬁcation allows for diﬀerential growth rates across time within MSAs and
across neighborhoods cross-sectionally within an MSA. Finally, we use what Lovenheim
(2009) terms “simulated housing price growth.” Household i’s simulated home price in MSA
s at time t conditional on its t − 4 home price is:




This simulated home price forces all growth between t − 4 and t to be due to MSA-level
housing price growth, which we calculate using the MSA-level housing price index described
in Section 2. We calculate the simulated housing price growth for two and four years, which
are deﬁned as ˆ Pist −Pist−2 and ˆ Pist −Pist−4, respectively. Conditional on MSA ﬁxed eﬀects,
these home price growth measures allow for only within-MSA variation in housing price
growth rates over time. In this speciﬁcation, our estimates of β1 only will be biased upward
if household selection patterns change over time across MSAs in such a way that families
that are more likely to have a child in the near future begin moving disproportionately into
MSAs where the housing price growth will be the highest. We believe such selection changes
are implausible, and we know of no evidence suggesting that migration patterns changed in
this way over the past 15-20 years.
Because home price changes, birth rates, and other demographics likely are highly corre-
lated over time within MSAs, we cluster our standard errors at the MSA-level throughout.
For respondents who do not live in an MSA, we create a separate non-MSA cluster for each
state. This method allows for arbitrary correlation of the errors within each state for rural
respondents and within each MSA for those living in an identiﬁable city.
15Results from estimation of equation 3 are shown in Table 4. Each column of the table
presents results from a separate regression, and all estimates include the full set of controls
shown in Table 3 as well as state macroeconomic controls. The ﬁrst three columns show our
estimates when state and year ﬁxed eﬀects are included in the model. In the ﬁrst column,
there is a negative and weak association between housing price levels and the likelihood
of giving birth. This ﬁnding either could be because there is little relationship between
housing wealth and fertility or because housing prices are a poor measure of housing wealth.
In Columns (2) and (3), respectively, we show the eﬀect of a 2-year and 4-year change in
housing values among homeowners on the likelihood of giving birth. In both columns, a
$10,000 change in home prices leads to a 0.0007 percentage point change in the likelihood of
having a child in the last year. These estimates are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the
5% level.
This marginal eﬀect is admittedly small. However, during the housing boom from 1999-
2005, the average two-year home price increase among homeowners was $48,024 and the
average four-year home price increase was $77,911. These increases translate into total
increases in the likelihood of having a child among homeowners of 0.34 and 0.55 percent,
respectively. Compared to the baseline fertility rate of 5.61 percent during this time period,
housing wealth increases in the early 2000s increased fertility by 6.1 percent (=0.34/5.61)
for the two-year change and 9.8 percent (=0.55/5.61) for the four-year change. Thus, the
recent variation in housing prices has been large enough to generate economically meaningful
changes in fertility among homeowners.
As discussed above, the assumption underlying the identiﬁcation of β1 in equation (3) is
that households with higher underlying fertility rates are not sorting into regions in which
housing prices are growing the fastest.12 In columns (4)-(6) of Table 4, we include MSA ﬁxed
eﬀects that control for the systematic diﬀerences among households across MSAs within
states in underlying fertility rates. Although these ﬁxed eﬀects signiﬁcantly reduce the
12Note that the majority of estimates of the eﬀect of household income on fertility suggest such selection
will bias us against ﬁnding positive results, because higher income families have fewer children.
16housing price change variation, the estimates are virtually identical to those using state
ﬁxed eﬀects.
In every column of Table 4, the income coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5%
level. The magnitudes range from -0.0004 to -0.0006 for a $10,0000 change in family income.
While these estimates can be interpreted as indicating a negative eﬀect of family income on
fertility, we urge caution in such an interpretation because we lack an instrument to generate
exogenous income variation in our sample. These negative coeﬃcients likely are driven by
many of the same biases that drive the negative cross-sectional correlation between fertility
and income at the aggregate level. We include income in our models as a control variable that
provides an important measure of each woman’s economic circumstances, but the coeﬃcient
on income likely does not identify a causal eﬀect. Importantly, all of our estimates are robust
to excluding family income from our models.
Even with MSA ﬁxed eﬀects, it still is possible our housing price growth estimates are
biased due to selection of households with diﬀerent fertility patterns into diﬀerent neigh-
borhoods with systematically diﬀerent housing price growth within an MSA. To account for
this possibility, we estimate equation (3) using simulated price changes within MSAs. As
previously discussed, this method restricts housing price growth to be the same in each year
in each MSA. The only variation in simulated price growth is within MSA over time, not
across households in an MSA. Table 5 shows the results using these price changes. The esti-
mates are slightly below those in Table 4: a $10,000 increase in home prices in the previous
two or four years is associated with a 0.0005 percentage point increase in the likelihood of
giving birth. Though these estimates are smaller, they still are statistically diﬀerent from
zero at the 5% level and indicate a sizeable eﬀect of housing wealth on fertility given the
large variation in home prices experienced recently in many cities in the United States.
The estimates thus far show positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects of housing wealth increases on
fertility decisions of the household for homeowners. These results are suggestive that children
are normal goods and that it is the added wealth from the home price increase that is driving
17this behavior. One test of whether the eﬀects we are estimating can be attributed to wealth
rather than to an MSA-level shock that is correlated both with housing prices and fertility
is to estimate our model for renters. For renters, the association between housing price and
fertility is likely negative (or at least non-positive). Higher home prices do not provide a
wealth increase to renters, but may increase rental prices and cause a substitution eﬀect.
We therefore estimate a version of equation (3) using MSA-by-year average home prices
for homeowners as the measure of housing price for renters. Analyzing renters’ fertility
behavior when MSA-level home prices increase also can be viewed as a means to estimate
the substitution eﬀect only, where the estimates for homeowners combine both the income
and substitution eﬀects.
Table 6 presents the estimates for renters. In column (1), there is a positive but not
signiﬁcant relationship between MSA-level prices and fertility among renters, but when we
switch our independent variable to be housing prices changes, the estimates become negative.
In no column is the home price estimate statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at
even the 10% level, but the negative coeﬃcient on home price changes in columns (2) and
(3) are suggestive of a small substitution eﬀect. Under the assumption that the renter
estimates of the fertility response to a housing price change identify the substitution eﬀect
for homeowners as well, these results implies that the income eﬀect for homeowners is up to
twice as large, particularly for the two year changes, than Tables 4 and 5 suggest. While these
results indicate a potentially large income eﬀect, they should be taken with caution because
as Table 3 shows, renters are quite diﬀerent along several dimensions than homeowners,
and the renter estimates are not precisely estimated. However, even without a signiﬁcant
substitution eﬀect, our results using the PSID data among homeowners unequivocally reject
a negative relationship between housing wealth and fertility and strongly suggest that those
who experience housing wealth increases are more likely to have children.
184 Conclusion
We use the housing market boom and bust to estimate the fertility response to a change
in housing wealth using state-level aggregate data as well as individual-level data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We show that at the state-aggregate level, housing prices
are negatively correlated with birth rates, but when one includes state ﬁxed eﬀects the eﬀect
becomes positive. In particular, there is a strong positive relationship between short-run
housing price growth and fertility at the state-level that suggests fertility responds positively
to wealth.
In order to delve more deeply into this relationship, we use micro-level data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) that allows us to examine fertility responses to housing
price changes separately by homeowner status and to more credibly control for selection. We
ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of both two-year and four-year housing price growth on
the likelihood that a woman has a child in the preceding year. Though the marginal eﬀect
of a $10,000 increase is small at about 0.0007, we argue this partial eﬀect is large enough
to be economically relevant given the large variation in housing prices experienced over the
past decade. Furthermore, our estimates are robust to using successively more restrictive
housing price growth measures, which suggests that selection of households across MSAs
or across areas within MSAs is not driving our results. We also ﬁnd little evidence of a
commensurate fertility response among renters; though our point estimates are negative,
they are not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at conventional levels.
Our results are consistent with a small but growing body of literature that calls into
question the conventional wisdom that fertility and family resources are negatively linked.
Our focus on wealth in general and housing wealth in particular is unique in this literature,
and it allows us to generate estimates of the eﬀect of family resources on fertility without
using wage shock measures that could aﬀect the relative tradeoﬀ of home versus market
work. Given the large and persistent declines in the housing market that have occurred
recently in many areas of the country, our results also have increasing policy relevance for
19potential policies aﬀecting both housing markets and the cost of raising children, including
child subsidies.
This paper also contributes to the literature on the eﬀects of housing market ﬂuctuations
by demonstrating that fertility choices are among the set of behaviors that are inﬂuenced by
changes in the housing market. Other work that has shown housing market eﬀects includes
Davidoﬀ (2009), who shows that the demand for long-term care insurance is negatively
aﬀected by housing wealth. Lovenheim (2009) shows that housing market changes aﬀect
college attendance and Lovenheim and Reynolds (2010) present evidence that this variation
impacts college choice and graduation likelihood as well. Many authors, including Campbell
and Cocco (2007), Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005), Hurst and Staﬀord (2004), and Lehnert
(2003), have found that housing wealth aﬀects consumption.13 Our results add to this
literature by showing that the recent severe declines in the housing market will also have
important fertility consequences.
13Attanasio et al. (2005) take issue with this interpretation of this literature, however, and argue this
relationship is incidental.
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25Table 1: State-Level Summary Statistics (weighted by state population)
Panel A: 1976-2008 measured quarterly
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
birthrate 6732 16.654 1.887 11.085 31.741
housing price index (HPI) 6732 30.483 9.982 11.511 78.494
unemployment rate 6732 6.086 1.892 2.033 18.1
real per capita income 6732 2.281 1.035 0.458 7.027
Panel B: 2000-2008 measured quarterly
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
birthrate 1836 16.742 1.694 11.661 24.573
housing price index (HPI) 1836 37.441 13.054 18.388 78.494
unemployment rate 1836 5.147 1.107 2.133 9.667
real per capita income 1836 3.470 0.578 2.125 7.027
1 The birthrate is births per 1,000 women age 15-44, calculated from the CDC Na-
tional Vital Statistics Report. The HPI is the Federal Housing Finance Agency
Housing Price Index (formerly the OFHEO index), which is constructed from all
repeat-sales single-family homes whose mortgages have been securitized by Fannie
Mae or Freddie Mac in each year. The unemployment rate and real income per
capita are calculated from BLS employment and income statistics combined with
state-level U.S. Census population estimates.
26Table 2: OLS Estimates of the Eﬀect of Housing Prices on Birthrate Using
Quarterly Aggregate State-level Measures, 1976-2008
Panel A: Current Home Price
Dependent Variable: Log(Birth Rate)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Housing Price Index (HPI)
-0.0020 -0.0021 0.0023∗∗ 0.0006
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Unemployment Rate
0.0038 0.0052 0.0039∗∗ 0.0038∗
(0.0052) (0.0083) (0.0008) (0.0022)
Real Per-capita Income
0.0165∗ -0.0130 -0.0025 0.0846∗∗
(0.0085) (0.0345) (0.0043) (0.0225)
Year Fixed Eﬀects No Yes No Yes
State Fixed Eﬀects No No Yes Yes
Observations 6732 6732 6732 6732
R-squared 0.118 0.187 0.746 0.795
Panel B: Lagged Percentage Change in Home Price
Dependent Variable: Log(Birth Rate)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Percentage Change HPI
0.1077 0.0953 0.1091∗∗ 0.0360∗
(0.0747) (0.0756) (0.0238) (0.0185)
Unemployment Rate
0.0073 0.0120 0.0075∗∗ 0.0085∗∗
(0.0055) (0.0091) (0.0012) (0.0025)
Real Per-capita Income
0.0003 -0.0537 0.0055 0.0461∗∗
(0.0057) (0.0327) (0.0048) (0.0224)
Year Fixed Eﬀects No Yes No Yes
State Fixed Eﬀects No No Yes Yes
Observations 6732 6732 6732 6732
R-squared 0.116 0.197 0.765 0.813
1 Source: Authors’ estimation of equation (1) as described in the text. All regressions
include quarter of year ﬁxed eﬀects and are weighted by the female population in each
state and year.
2 Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses: **
indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level and * indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
27Table 3: PSID Summary Statistics
Panel A: Homeowners
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Birth 36245 0.049 0.216 0 1
Home Value ($10,000) 36245 16.559 15.373 .104 332.274
2-Year Home Value Change ($10,000) 36245 3.493 7.433 -29.765 49.609
4-Year Home Value Change ($10,000) 36245 6.052 10.100 -29.982 145.370
Married 36245 0.597 0.491 0 1
Real Family Income ($10,000) 36245 8.962 8.555 -11.615 348.368
Children 36245 1.468 1.212 0 9
Age 15-19 36245 0.179 0.384 0 1
Age 20-24 36245 0.118 0.323 0 1
Age 25-29 36245 0.128 0.334 0 1
Age 30-34 36245 0.173 0.378 0 1
Age 35-39 36245 0.203 0.403 0 1
Age 40-44 36245 0.199 0.399 0 1
High School Drop Out 36245 0.192 0.394 0 1
High School Diploma 36245 0.323 0.468 0 1
Some College 36245 0.238 0.426 0 1
College Grad 36245 0.165 0.371 0 1
Education Missing 36245 0.082 0.274 0 1
Panel B: Renters
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Birth 36162 0.069 0.254 0 1
Market Average Home Price ($10,000) 36162 16.946 8.663 0.819 69.224
2-Year Market Home Value Change ($10,000) 36162 0.809 4.541 -136.809 112.708
4-Year Market Home Value Change ($10,000) 36162 2.153 6.471 -144.120 134.970
Married 36162 0.372 0.403 0 1
Real Family Income ($10,000) 36162 3.972 3.538 -8.652 155.748
Children 36162 1.4883 1.404 0 9
Age 15-19 36162 0.150 0.357 0 1
Age 20-24 36162 0.203 0.402 0 1
Age 25-29 36162 0.207 0.405 0 1
Age 30-34 36162 0.181 0.385 0 1
Age 35-39 36162 0.145 0.352 0 1
Age 40-44 36162 0.114 0.318 0 1
High School Drop Out 36162 0.294 0.456 0 1
High School Diploma 36162 0.343 0.475 0 1
Some College 36162 0.196 0.397 0 1
College Grad 36162 0.083 0.276 0 1
Education Missing 36162 0.084 0.277 0 1
1 Source: Authors’ calculations from the 1980-2007 Panel Study of Income Dynamics as described in the
text. Negative income values indicate net losses for the family in that year. All monetary means are in
real $2008, and were inﬂated using the CPI-U.
2 In Panel A, all home values are self-reported and apply to the homeowner. In Panel B, housing values
are averages among homeowners in the sample at the MSA-by-year level. We the calculate means of
these average over all renters, which are what is shown in Panel B.
28Table 4: Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Eﬀect Housing Prices on Birth Probability for Home-
owners
Dependent Variable: Dummy=1 if Give Birth in the Previous Year
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Home Value ($10,000)
-0.0001∗ . . -0.0002∗ . .
(0.0001) . . (0.0001) . .
2-Year Home Value Change ($10,000)
. 0.0007∗∗ . . 0.0006∗∗ .
. (0.0002) . . (0.0002) .
4-Year Home Value Change ($10,000)
. . 0.0007∗∗ . . 0.0007∗∗
. . (0.0002) . . (0.0002)
Real Family Income ($10,000)
-0.0004∗∗ -0.0006∗∗ -0.0006∗∗ -0.0004∗∗ -0.0005∗∗ -0.0006∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
MSA Fixed Eﬀects? No No No Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.050 0.050 0.051 0.064 0.064 0.064
1 Source: Authors’ estimation of equation (3) using the 1980-2007 Panel Study of Income Dynamics as described in the text.
All estimates include state and year ﬁxed eﬀects, age group dummies (with 15-19 as the excluded category), educational
attainment dummies (with no high school diploma as the excluded category), and controls for marital status, the number
of other children in the household, state-by-year unemployment rates and state-by-year real income per capita.
2 Estimates in columns (4)-(6) use only those respondents who live in an identiﬁable MSA at the time of the interview.
3 Standard errors clustered at the MSA-level are in parentheses. In columns (1)-(3), respondents not in an MSA are assigned
to a non-MSA state-speciﬁc cluster. ** indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level and * indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
2
9Table 5: Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Eﬀect
Housing Prices on Birth Probability for Homeowners
Using Simulated MSA-level Housing Price Changes
Dependent Variable: Dummy=1 if Give Birth in
the Previous Year
Independent Variable (1) (2)
2-Year Home Value Change ($10,000)
0.0005∗∗ .
(0.0002) .
4-Year Home Value Change ($10,000)
. 0.0005∗∗
. (0.0001)




1 Source: Authors’ estimation of equation (3) using the 1980-2007 Panel
Study of Income Dynamics and simulated housing price changes as
described in the text. All estimates include MSA and year ﬁxed eﬀects,
age group dummies (with 15-19 as the excluded category), educational
attainment dummies (with no high school diploma as the excluded
category), and controls for marital status, the number of other children
in the household, state-by-year unemployment rates and state-by-year
real income per capita.
2 The estimation sample includes only those respondents who live in an
identiﬁable MSA at the time of the interview and who own a home.
3 Standard errors clustered at the MSA-level are in parentheses: **
indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level and * indicates signiﬁcance at
the 10% level.
30Table 6: Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Eﬀect Housing Prices
on Birth Probability for Renters Using MSA-average Home Price
Measures Among Homeowners
Dependent Variable: Dummy=1 if Give Birth in the Previous Year




2-Year Home Value Change ($10,000)
. -0.0004 .
. (0.0004) .
4-Year Home Value Change ($10,000)
. . -0.0001
. . (0.0003)
Real Family Income ($10,000)
-0.0019∗∗ -0.0018∗∗ -0.0014∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007)
R2 0.051 0.052 0.056
1 Source: Authors’ estimation of equation (3) using the 1980-2007 Panel Study of
Income Dynamics and housing price measures calculated using homeowners within
each MSA and year as described in the text. All estimates include MSA and year
ﬁxed eﬀects, age group dummies (with 15-19 as the excluded category), educational
attainment dummies (with no high school diploma as the excluded category), and
controls for marital status, the number of other children in the household, state-by-
year unemployment rates and state-by-year real income per capita.
2 The estimation sample includes only those respondents who live in an identiﬁable
MSA at the time of the interview and who do not own a home.
3 Standard errors clustered at the MSA-level are in parentheses: ** indicates signiﬁ-
cance at the 5% level and * indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
31Table A-1: Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Eﬀect Housing
Prices on Birth Probability for Homeowners With State-by-
year Fixed Eﬀects
Dependent Variable: Dummy=1 if Give Birth in the Previous Year




2-Year Home Value Change ($10,000)
. 0.0007∗∗ .
. (0.0002) .
4-Year Home Value Change ($10,000)
. . 0.0007∗∗
. . (0.0002)
Real Family Income ($10,000)
-0.0004∗∗ -0.0005∗∗ -0.0006∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
R2 0.067 0.067 0.068
1 Source: Authors’ estimation of equation (3) using the 1980-2007 Panel Study of
Income Dynamics as described in the text. All estimates include state-by-year
ﬁxed eﬀects, age group dummies (with 15-19 as the excluded category), educational
attainment dummies (with no high school diploma as the excluded category), and
controls for marital status, and the number of other children in the household.
2 Standard errors clustered at the MSA-level are in parentheses. Respondents not in
an MSA are assigned to a non-MSA state-speciﬁc cluster. ** indicates signiﬁcance
at the 5% level and * indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
32